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although this practice is not effective.
Snails and slugs withdrew from pro-
duce after the molluscicide was
applied to surrounding vegetation, but
returned after several days. We pur-
chased a lettuce head that had been
reportedly treated with molluscicides
at the Coronation Market and found a
small slug inside. The role of produce
in transmitting A. cantonensis is still
unclear; humans may become infect-
ed by inadvertently consuming small
slugs or other infected hosts or by
consuming produce directly contami-
nated with larvae. Infections in slugs
have not been found in previous stud-
ies conducted on the island (2).
Regardless, the use of molluscicides
to limit human infection from produce
is an ineffective strategy.
At the Coronation Market, vendors
repeatedly used a bucket of water to
rinse vegetables before displaying
them. This practice could transmit A.
cantonensis in 2 ways. First, if free lar-
vae are deposited on vegetables in
either the slime or feces of mollusks,
cross contamination can occur.
Second, dead or decaying intermediate
hosts may release larvae into water (6).
If infected mollusks were rinsed from
vegetables into the buckets, the water
could become contaminated with lar-
vae. While cross-contamination by
common wash buckets has not been
implicated in an outbreak of a parasitic
infection, it has been linked to out-
breaks of other infectious agents (7,8).
Vendors at venues such as
Coronation Market primarily buy pro-
duce to sell. These vendors typically
purchase their produce from interme-
diaries who purchase and transport it
from farms in outlying areas. As a con-
sequence, many vendors are unsure of
the farm or region from which their
produce came. This practice makes it
difficult, if not impossible, for health
officials and researchers to isolate and
link etiologic agents with particular
produce items or regions and compli-
cates the investigation of any food-
borne infection.
A. cantonensis is an important par-
asitic agent in Jamaica for which a
definitive route of infection is often
not found. We found that potential
paratenic hosts are occasionally eaten
raw. Because of the high prevalence
of  A. cantonensis infection in mol-
lusks in certain parts of Jamaica, con-
sumption of raw, infected shrimp may
be a source of sporadic angiostron-
gyliasis on the island. Control of A.
cantonensis is complicated because of
the apparent ineffectiveness of mol-
luscicides, the potential for cross-con-
tamination of produce at markets, and
the difficulty of tracking produce and
other products to their source.
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Nipah Virus Strain
Variation
To the Editor: AbuBakar et al.
described strain variation in Nipah
virus during the 1998–1999 outbreak
in Malaysia (1). They found an isolate
from pigs in Perak, as well as from a
flying fox, that differed markedly
from pig and human isolates from the
main epidemic in southern Malaysia.
AbuBakar et al. proposed that this
finding indicates 2 separate spillover
events from bats to pigs occurred, the
first in Perak in 1998 and the second
in southern Malaysia in 1999.
However, investigations at the time of
the outbreak showed that many pigs
were moved from Perak onto southern
farms in early 1999. We suggest that
successive spillovers of the pig popu-
lation in the north can also explain the
observed strain differences between
northern and southern isolates.
A model from experimental stud-
ies and active farm data demonstrate
that Nipah virus may have circulated
repeatedly and become endemic
within 1 or several large pig farms in
Perak (J.R.C. Pulliam, unpub. data),
which is consistent with the occur-
rence of human cases in Perak before
the 1998–1999 outbreak. Evolution
of the virus population in pigs, fol-
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lowed by the reintroduction in Perak
of the original strain from bats and its
subsequent southward movement in
infected pigs, would explain
observed strain differences. Models
suggest that evolution of the virus
within pig populations would result
in lower death rates but prolonged ill-
ness. Although the pig-adapted virus
strain may have circulated on both
northern and southern farms, sam-
pling biases in favor of the more vir-
ulent strain would be expected in
areas of high death rates, which
would explain the observed genetic
relationships between sequenced iso-
lates.
We suggest that pigs be experi-
mentally infected with the Perak
strain of Nipah virus to determine
whether differences exist in illness
and death caused by this virus.
Further sequencing of virus from
archived pig samples will clarify with
greater confidence whether multiple
strains circulated in both regions.
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In response: Pulliam et al. (1) pre-
sented a model to help explain the
observed Nipah virus (NV) strain dif-
ferences reported earlier by AbuBakar
et al. (2). The model is built around an
assumption that NV was endemic in
several pig farms in the north of
Malaysia and that a subsequent rein-
troduction of the original NV caused
the fatal encephalitis outbreak in
1998.
While the model is plausible, that
NV infection was endemic among
pigs before the 1998 outbreak is diffi-
cult to imagine in the absence of veri-
fiable evidence. As with any virus that
crosses species, NV would likely have
caused severe infection, and what
happened in 1998 is a classic exam-
ple. Before NV could have evolved,
become less virulent, and subsequent-
ly become endemic, it would have
been first introduced to pigs. This ini-
tial introduction would have caused
an outbreak, but no such outbreaks
were reported before 1998.
Furthermore, the life span of pigs
reared in farms is relatively short
before they are sent to the markets,
which limits the time in which NV
evolution could take place.
Slaughtering these pigs would also
have caused infection among abattoir
workers and pork handlers. At pres-
ent, the finding of 2 different NV
strains from 2 different outbreak foci
favors the suggestion that 2 possibly
overlapping NVoutbreaks occurred in
Malaysia in 1998. Further investiga-
tion of NV archived materials would
shed further light into the possible ori-
gin of NV in the 1998 Malaysia out-
breaks.
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Trichinellosis
Outbreak 
To the Editor: Trichinellosis is a
zoonotic disease caused by the nema-
tode Trichinella. Although now
uncommon as a result of public health
control measures, trichinellosis out-
breaks have been reported in the
United States (1), Europe (2,3),
Mexico (4), Thailand (5), Canada (6),
Lebanon (7–10), and elsewhere.
In Israel, the disease is rare
because most Jewish and Muslim cit-
izens avoid eating pork. Until 1997,
only 6 small outbreaks were reported
in humans; they occurred mostly in
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